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1. Introduction1
 
If the EU were to apply for membership in the EU, it would not qualify because of the 
inadequate democratic content of its constitution. Nevertheless, a good 50 percent of the 
acts passed in France today are in fact merely the implementation of measures decided 
upon in the opaque labyrinth of institutions in far-away Brussels,2 so, is France still 
democratically governed? The picture is similar with respect to other international institutions 
in the OECD world. The WTO system of agreements, for instance, comprises almost 10 000 
pages and is the result of marathon negotiations lasting over a decade and in which over 150 
states and thousands of experts participated. Although these agreements contain far-
reaching implications for employees in crisis-prone industrial sectors and in agriculture, the 
German government is generally almost overzealous in implementing the demands 
stipulated in the agreements. Did German citizens really have a recognizable influence on 
these decisions? The problem is clear. Although security and social welfare, two important 
aims of governance, can be better achieved with international institutions than without them, 
the mere existence of international institutions is no guarantee of good governance. Apart 
from producing effective solutions to problems within the fields of security and welfare, 
governance must also fulfil certain procedural requirements in order to be rated as good. 
From the point of view of democratic theory, however, international institutions have very 
shaky foundations. Against this background, Robert Dahl (1994) pointed almost 
paradigmatically to a fundamental dilemma of politics in the age of globalization: the 
contradiction between "system effectiveness and citizen participation."3  
 
This paper aims at questioning the notion of a contradiction between – to use the terms of 
Fritz Scharpf (1997b) – output legitimacy (acceptance created by system effectiveness) and 
input legitimacy (acceptance created by democratic procedures). I shall first argue that 
viewing the problem as a choice between "effective problem-solving through international 
institutions" and "democractic political processes" is already in normative terms a false 
approach (Section 1). International institutions not only increase system effectiveness or 
output-legitimacy, but are also a normatively sensible response to the problems for 
democracy that are caused by globalization. At the same time, it is indisputable that the 
actual functioning of these international institutions does not meet democratic standards. In 
Section 2 I present the skeptical argument that most deficits in the working of international 
institutions cannot easily be remedied, since democratic majority decisions depend – in 
descriptive terms – on a political community that is based on trust and solidarity. Although 
other forms of transnational interest aggregation, such as intergovernmental bargaining and 
                                                                                 
1 This project began with an invitation from Louis Pauly and Michael Greven to further develop an 
argument that was first put forward in Zürn (1998: chap. 13). This article represents a significant 
extension and revision of the first fruit of the project, which will be published shortly (Greven/Pauly 
1999). The author wishes to thank Oliver Gerstenberg, Edgar Grande and Bernhard Peters for 
helpful comments, and Vicki May for translating parts of the manuscript and brushing up the other 
parts. 
2 See Majone (1996: 59). For Germany, von Beyme (1998: 24-25) focuses on key issues and thus 
arrives at smaller, but still significant percentages. 
3 Early contributions to the current debate were, among others, Czempiel 1991, Gilbert 1990, 
Held/McGrew 1993, Scharpf 1993, Pogge 1992 and Zürn 1992a. See Dryzek (1996) and McGrew 
1997 for good surveys and Kaiser (1972) for a similar argument in a yet unchanged world. 
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arguing among transnational epistemic communities may exist, the lack of a transnational 
demos combined with the existence of transnational social spaces poses a problem that 
cannot easily be overcome. Skeptics therefore see a structural dilemma that cannot be 
reconciled by democratizing international institutions; to a certain extent they are necessary 
for effective policies, but they are structurally undemocratic. The skeptical argument is 
founded on two more or less explicit background hypotheses that can be empirically 
challenged. The first background hypothesis states that a demos cannot exist at the 
transnational level. In Section 3, I will modify this statement in theoretical terms and offer 
some conceptual distinctions that may prepare the ground for further empirical investigation. 
The second background hypothesis of the skeptics postulates a zero-sum relationship 
between national sovereignty and supranationality. Thus, any institutional solution between 
the poles of nation-state sovereignty and supranational statehood, be it the EU or a world 
state, will necessarily encroach on both system effectiveness and democratic legitimation. 
Against this background I shall in Section 4 make some concrete institutional proposals that 
undermine the zero-sum logic of the skeptics, concluding that in a denationalized society, 
democratic legitimation can only be achieved by a mixed constitution comprising majority 
procedures and negotiation mechanisms. 
 
The problems and issues discussed in this paper have emerged in different contexts, most 
prominently in the debate on the democratic deficit of the EU. The EU is a special case since 
it represents a new type of political system, made up of national and European institutions 
which are constituted in relation to each other. West European national institutions and the 
EU institutions are so closely interwoven that they can no longer be conceived as separate 
political systems (see Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996; Marks et al. 1996). This  multi-level 
system of the EU has two distinct features that seperate it from other international 
institutions. First, the regulations issued in the different European sectors (European 
regimes, if you wish) are so closely related to each other that as a network they affect a 
number of political issue areas at once within a more or less clearly defined territory. This 
justifies the use of the terms European Community and multi-level system. In contrast, issue-
specific international institutions such as international regimes are more functional, and the 
sum of any number of international regimes does not cover a recognizable territorial space.4 
Here, the term multi-level politics (for each specific institution) is more appropriate. The 
second distinctive feature of the EU multi-level system is that in contrast to international 
regimes, which are by and large passive, some European institutions, such as the European 
Court of Justice and the European Commission, are indeed supranational in that they have 
authoritative powers which directly affect national administrations and societies. In spite of 
these far-reaching differences, the thrust of this paper applies to both international 
institutions in general and the European Union in particular. Where specific steps in the 
argumentation refer to one or the other type of institution I shall qualify my statements 
accordingly. 
                                                                                 
4 For surveys on international regimes see Levy et al. (1995) and Hasenclever et al. (1998). 
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2. Denationalization and Democracy 
 
"Persons (...) should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their own 
lives, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others" (Held 1995: 
147). On the basis of this principle of autonomy, democracy is, in very general terms, a 
process of public will-formation and decision-making in which everybody affected by a 
decision has the same opportunity to actively participate and exert their influence.5 Moreover, 
democracy – as understood here – is required to produce normatively justifiable solutions. 
Such a concept of democracy rejects purely proceduralist or republican interpretations that 
reduce democracy to a decision-making system regardless of the content of the decisions. At 
the same time, it challenges purely liberal or constitutionalist definitions which regard 
individual political rights as pre-politically given and seek to protect them from the outcomes 
of the democratic process. This concept of democracy is reflective in the sense that the 
fundamental normative requirements of the democratic process, such as autonomous 
individuals with freedom of opinion and information, and the democratic process itself are 
seen as mutually reproductive.6 It consists of two components: a democratic principle – that 
is, everyone affected by a decision should have a chance to participate – to which most 
theorists of democracy would agree, and a deliberative principle – any decision should be 
backed up by arguments committed to values of rationality and impartiality – which is more 
contested (cf. Elster 1998a: 8). In order to show that globalization is already causing 
problems for national democracies, I will refer to the democratic principle and thus argue that 
this is true for most concepts of democracy. In order to show that the social conditions for 
democracy beyond the nation state are not necessarily impossible to fulfil, I shall also refer to 
the deliberative principle, thus taking up the most ambitious conception of democracy. In 
doing so, the most difficult yardstick is used for both steps of the argument. 
 
How does societal denationalization – in my opinion a more precise term than globalization7 
– affect democracy as we know it? A logical corollary of the democratic principle is the 
congruence between social and political spaces (Scharpf 1993, Held 1995:16), which was for 
a long time not treated as a fundamental problem in modern democratic theory. The notion of 
a nation state consisting of a more or less contained national society, a clearly demarcated 
territory and an administrative apparatus constituted to provide services for this society and 
territory, led theorists to treat congruence as given. The notion of a territorially defined nation 
state was hence used as a shortcut to ensure the spatial congruence between rulers (the 
nation state) and subjects (the national society). Yet this notion becomes problematic as 
                                                                                 
5 Besides Held (1995) see especially Rawls (1971) and Dahl (1994), two foremost contemporary 
thinkers on democracy. 
6 This formulation takes up the central thoughts of deliberative democratic theory. See, among 
others, Cohen (1989), Cohen/Sabel (1997), Elster (1998b), Habermas (1994), Benhabib (1996), 
Gerstenberg (1997a). 
7 Societal denationalization can be defined as a shift in the borders of dense transactions (these 
borders are defined as the place where a significant reduction in the frequency and intensity of 
given interactions occurs, cf. Deutsch 1969) beyond national borders, but not necessarily to the 
extent of being globalized. In a research project funded by the German Research Association we 
developed 72 indicators to determine the extent of societal and political denationalization. See 
Beisheim et al. (1999), and a summarized version in Walter et al. (1999). See also Goldblatt et al. 
(1997). 
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soon as the nature of the relevant community is contested, as has happened in the course of 
societal denationalization. The increase in cross-border transactions infringes on the 
normative dignity of political borders (Schmalz-Bruns 1998: 372; see also Held 1998).  
 
For the purposes of democracy, spatial congruence is necessary at two critical points: first, 
between the people who are affected by a decision and their representatives in the decision-
making system (input congruence) and second, between the space in which regulations are 
valid and the space in which the social interactions to which the decision refers take place 
(output congruence). If there is no input congruence, then a group affected by a decision but 
not participating in its making can be considered to have been determined by others instead 
of self-determined. Traditional forms of foreign determination or dominance were 
asymmetrical – for instance, when a small group of colonial rulers ruled over a large group of 
people in a colony. Today, however, foreign determination has taken on a different 
appearance. It tends to be more symmetrical and is based on manifold externalities, as a 
result of which many political decisions have, if not unlimited, at least transboundary effects. 
For example, the decisions of the British and German governments in the 1960s and 1970s 
not to implement certain environmental protection measures led to acid lakes and high fish 
mortality in Scandinavia. However, the Swedish fishermen were not in a position to 
participate in public will-formation and were not allowed to participate in decision-making in 
Great-Britain or Germany. This constitutes a democratic deficit. As early as 1945, Carr saw 
the moral deficits in exclusive political communities whose privileges were established on the 
basis of exporting harm abroad. What was true then is even truer today in the age of societal 
denationalization: the extension of the moral and political community to encompass the 
interests of all those affected by decisions made within that community is a normative 
democratic requirement (see also Linklater 1998: chap. 5).  
 
The congruence of the space for which regulations are valid and the boundaries of the 
relevant social transactions – i.e. output incongruence – is also significant for democratic 
legitimation. According to Alexy "de jure freedom, that is the legal authorization to do or 
refrain from doing something, is worth nothing without de facto freedom, that is factual 
freedom of choice" (Alexy 1985, 458, translation: M.Z.). In a denationalized world ruled by a 
system of formally independent nation states, there is a danger that political communities 
cannot reach a desired goal due to conditions outside their jurisdiction. For instance, a social 
policy desired by the majority of the population of a given political community can become 
unaffordable for reasons of international competitiveness. In this case, the political system is 
unable to act on behalf of the collective, thus producing a new type of "non-decision." "Non-
decisions" were identified as a normative deficit of existing democracies by critical theorists a 
long time ago (Bachrach/Baratz 1974). The systematic incorporation of such "selectivity 
practised by political institutions" – to use another concept to grasp this problem (Offe 1972: 
74) – is attempted, for instance, by the so-called Ordo-Liberals who strive for a European 
economic constitution which on the one hand fosters European market integration, but on the 
other prevents political interventions in the market. Such a "constitutional division of 
economic powers" (Mestmäcker 1994: 274) constitutes a democratic limitation. Economic 
liberties, the domestic market and the system of undistorted competition must be the 
justifiable results of a process of public will-formation and decision-making. They cannot 
simply be withdrawn from this process and declared as pre-political issues.  
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Of course, it is necessary to be "realistic" about setting democratic criteria, and to avoid 
falling victim to the myth of "democratic omnipotence" (Scharpf 1997b). Political systems 
always had to take external restraints into account. But from a critical perspective it is equally 
vital not to simply resign and adjust normative standards to political reality. There is 
unquestionably a "need to re-set the standards by which we assess legitimacy" (Majone 
1998:5). However, the new concept must derive from normative standards which adequately 
reflect new circumstances, and not be purely the result of empirical observations. If, because 
of an output incongruence, certain traditional governance goals which were pursued and 
achieved in the heyday of the democratic welfare state can no longer be achieved, then there 
is also a democratic deficit.  
 
Thus, choosing between the alternative of "effective problem-solving through international 
institutions" or "democractic political processes" is not a particularly fruitful exercise. In 
democratic terms, international institutions are a sensible response to the problems facing 
democracy in times of societal denationalization as they help to redress the incongruence 
between social and political spaces. Theoretically, the "emergence of denationalized 
governance structures" (Joerges 1996) helps to bring all those who are affected by a political 
decision into the decision-making system, thus observing the principle of "no taxation without 
representation". What is more, international institutions help to increase the factual freedom 
of political communities. Governance beyond the nation state can therefore improve both 
social welfare and democracy in the face of societal denationalization. In this sense, 
international institutions are not the problem, but part of the solution to the problems of 
modern democracy. This theoretical consideration is reflected in a European-wide survey 
which shows that a similar percentage of the population is dissatisfied with the working of 
democracy at the national level (48 per cent) and at the European level (49 per cent) (see 
Eurobarometer 1994). The current major problem for modern democracy is not political but 
societal denationalization which undermines the normative dignity of political borders by 
increasing political externalities in integrated markets (due to input incongruence), and by 
reducing the autonomy of nation states (due to output incongruence).  
 
 
3. Social Prerequisites for Democracy Within and Beyond the Nation State 
 
Although in principle, international institutions may compensate for democratic deficits 
brought about by input and output incongruence, at the same time they create new 
democratic deficits. The greater the significance of such international institutions, the greater 
the need for democratic legitimation of their decisions. At the moment – and this is where 
analysts are almost unanimous – this legitimation is clearly inadequate. There are two 
strands of thought among those who identify a democratic deficit in the way international 
institutions work. One strand points to institutional deficits in the EU and other international 
institutions that can be adjusted through reforms, provided there is the right political will.8 
Another strand considers these suggestions as naive and even questions the mere 
possibility of democratic processes beyond the nation state because the EU and other 
                                                                                 
8 Thus argue many in favor of a strengthening of the European Parliament. See, for instance, 
Hänsch (1986) and Williams (1991). 
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international institutions cannot meet the social prerequisites for democracy. I wish to 
introduce here a third position, which accepts the focus on social prerequisites, but also 
emphasizes the complexities and dynamics of the relationship between political institutions 
and social attitudes, seeing in them a potential to foster democracy beyond the nation state 
through institutional reform that aims to meet the social prerequisites for democracy. 
 
According to skeptics, democratic legitimacy is only possible within the framework of a 
demos, i.e. a political community with the potential for democratic self-governance as 
expressed in the concept of the modern nation. Beyond the nation state, the social 
prerequisites for a democratic political community – the political space – are missing (Greven 
1997, 1998). Peter Graf Kielmannsegg (1994: 27) eloquently summarizes this point of view 
with respect to Europe: "Collective identities develop, become stable and are passed into 
tradition in communities of communication, of experiences and of memories. Europe, even 
within the narrower scope of Western Europe, has no communication community, hardly any 
common memories and only limited common experiences (translation: M.Z.)". Hence, the 
connection between nation and democracy is not an historical coincidence but systematic 
and indissoluble.9 A demos as exemplified in the modern nation state requires cultural 
homogeneity, and without a demos there is no democracy.10
 
This line of argument is particularly relevant to majority decisions, which are often regarded 
as the central component of the democratic process. The principle of majority decisions 
holds that when a collectively binding decision is taken everyone must comply with it, 
including those actors who voted against it (Scharpf 1997a: chap. 7). As a rule, however, 
outvoted actors will only accept a decision if certain sanctions are applied for non-compliance 
and if the burdens imposed by the decision are regarded as an obligation. In order to accept 
an obligation, i.e. to voluntarily act in accordance with an inconvenient norm and not simply 
do something out of a fear of sanctions, people must have two firm convictions: trust that all 
members of the community will also abide by the norm, and solidarity towards those who 
may benefit from it (Offe 1998: 104). Following this argument, however, it appears that both 
the necessarily high degree of trust and solidarity and the establishment of an accepted 
system of sanctions are only possible within the context of "both a commonly inhabited (and 
usually undivided) territory on the one hand and a history that is interpreted as 'concerning all 
of us' on the other." (Offe 1998: 101, translation: M.Z.). Therefore, without a nation and 
sufficient cultural homogeneity there seems to be no basis for a democratic majority decision 
(Miller 1995).  
It is consequently argued in comparative politics that where there is no sufficiently stable 
national identity it is better to give precedence to bargaining and "consociational" procedures 
rather than majority decisions. Accordingly, Gerhard Lehmbruch (1992: 210), one of the 
                                                                                 
9 See also Decision on the Maastricht Treaty of the 2nd Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court 
from March 13th, 1990 - 2 BvR 94/88 u.a., in: Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift 20:17, 429 - 
446. 
10 The number of terms that are used in order to describe the social prerequisites for democracy are 
manifold: sense of community, sense of identity, demos, nation, solidarity and trust are only the 
most important ones. I use the terms as follows: Political community is the most generic term 
describing any collective in the name of which political decisions are made. The specific type of 
political community that is capable of organizing itself democratically is called a demos, which 
fulfils different social prerequisites such as possessing a collective identity or sense of solidarity. 
However, since I present some of the sceptics' arguments in their terms, it is not possible to be 
entirely consistent in this section.   
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foremost analysts of so-called consociational or concordant democracies, writes with regard 
to countries such as Switzerland or Austria: "In the development phase of culturally 
fragmented societies, which is characterized by vertically integrated ‘factions' or ‘pillars', 
concordant democracies are strategically planned by the organisational elites of the rivalling 
sides, as they know that they cannot reckon with certain gains in majority decision 
procedures (translation: M.Z.)." 
 
Nevertheless, even negotiation systems that require unanimous decisions are dependent on 
the participants' attitudes to each other, in other words, on social prerequisites. In the first 
place, the absense of a minimal sense of "togetherness" tends to make relations among 
social units competitive. Competitive relations, however, encourage participants to be relative 
gains-seekers, impeding cooperation in the pursuit of longer-term objectives (Grieco 1990, 
Scharpf 1997a). This means that efforts to coordinate the improvement of welfare often fail 
before they begin, and this is clearly inconsistent with the democratic requirement that 
outcomes be normatively justifiable. At the least, actors have to accept each other as 
autonomous individuals, endowed with rights and legitimate interests in the political process. 
Even if this minimum requirement is fulfilled, coordination in bargaining systems still depends 
on additional, favorable conditions (Zürn 1992b: chap. 2). Efforts to coordinate through 
bargaining are often only successful if the participants have a positive attitude towards each 
other, i.e. if there is a weak form of collective identity defined by a utility function in which the 
welfare (or the suffering) of the collective is part of the individual preferences.11  
 
Yet even negotiation systems with participants bound together by a weak collective identity 
easily produce deficient outcomes as long as bargaining dominates over arguing. Bargaining 
is a form of interest-aggregation that builds on the exchange of threats and promises (Elster 
1993). It reflects the "exchange perspective" on governance according to which the art of 
politics is the crafting of pareto-improving changes. It assumes a given structure of rights and 
rules, a given distribution of preferences and a given distribution of resources (March/Olsen 
1995: chap. 1). Arguing is another way of reaching a decision when the initial distribution of 
opinions is not consensual. It is based on claims of validity rather than threats and promises 
and reflects an "institutional perspective" of governance according to which common values 
are crucial to the understanding of politics. Arguing is a major component of deliberative 
democracy. Although solidarity is not imperative for a model of deliberative democracy 
among public interest-oriented associations, the deliberations of the representatives imply 
that at least common goals and values exist – that is, a third reference point independent of 
the participants' individual interests that either really transcends individual interests or at 
least unleashes the "civilizing force of hypocrisy" (Elster 1998a: 12). If there are no common 
goals and values to which reference can be made, deliberation cannot take place. In this 
respect, it appears that deliberative networks depend on the existence of favorable attitudes 
on the side of the participating actors.  
                                                                                 
11 The uses of the term collective identity are manifold (cf. Jepperson et al. 1996, and Waever et al. 
1993). I use it here in the following way: Social identity describes an individual categorization to 
one group on the basis of common features. Converging social identities that are also socially 
expressed and thus create a sense of belonging are weak collective identities. Weak collective 
identities are indicated by a utility function in which the welfare (or the suffering) of the collective is 
part of the individual preferences. National identities are an example of strong collective identities 
with individual interests subordinate to the well-being of the collective and thus a willingness on 
the part of the individuals to make certain sacrifices.    
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As with majority decisions, it also appears to hold true for negotiation systems based on 
unanimity that the democratic quality of decision-making depends on the existence of certain 
social prerequisites in the respective political community. Without at least a weak form of 
common identity, negotiation systems cannot claim to have a democratic quality. In other 
words, democratic governance beyond the nation state without at least elements of a 
transnational demos is not possible. 
 
Moreover, any decision-making system based on negotiations between representatives of 
functional or territorial interest groups that waives majority decisions has additional 
weaknesses. As a rule, consensus-oriented deliberations and negotiations are more 
successful with a small number of actors and (at least sometimes) in camera.12 Yet both 
closed sessions and a biased selection of participants contradict democratic principles. Most 
importantly, the accountability of decision-makers decreases signifcantly. Negotiation 
systems as a whole are not directly subject to any form of democratic scrutiny, there are 
usually no constitutents who can punish the negotiation-system as a whole. The indirect 
legitimacy of  those negotiation systems thus depends on the accountability of each 
participant in the negotiation system. The ability of constituents to reverse decisions via their 
representatives depends in turn not only on the existence of real power on the side of the 
constituency to punish its representatives, but also on the existence of sufficient information 
about their activities. But it is preciseley these negotiation systems with separate decision-
making levels and which adhere to the international diplomatic rules of secrecy at the top 
level, which do not deliver the information constituents need. Within these settings, the 
opportunity of strategic manipulation of information is wide open to decision-makers.13 The 
lack of transparency also makes it impossible to judge whether or not the selection of certain 
participants leads to a systematic exclusion of relevant points of view. In other words, in their 
current form, negotiation systems beyond the nation state are linked with unequal chances of 
participation and a disregard of the principle of public accessibility (Benz 1998). 
 
Furthermore, even when consensus-oriented negotiation systems are open to many actors, 
as a rule they deal with specific problems in given issue areas. The most inclusive issue 
area-specific negotiation systems include representatives of all groups from different 
countries which are in one way or another the objects of a given regulation. In such cases, 
issue networks are set up which at best constitute sectoral publics with close communication 
between the participants (Eder/Hellmann/Trenz 1998: 324-326). Such sectoral publics permit 
a higher level of active participation in comparison to the general national publics. However, 
a broader public brings in the interests of all those who are indirectly affected by a regulation 
and builds a link between the regulatory needs of specific issue areas (system integration) 
and the perceptions of the people (social integration) (Habermas 1994: 78) . Hence, issue 
                                                                                 
12 See Benz 1998. See also Elster 1993 for a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages 
of publicity in constitution-making decision systems.  
13 See the analyses that are informed by the notion of two-level games for this point, especially 
Putnam (1988), the contributions in Evans et al. (1993) and Zangl (1999). See also the 
accusations of the Greens in Germany regarding the policy of the Kohl government on an energy 
tax. In the national context, demands for an energy tax were staved off by referring to the need for 
an European policy on this issue. However, in the relevant European negotiation system, Finance 
minister Waigel secretly blocked such a policy. Interview with a staff member of the Green faction 
in German Parliament, 26.5.1998. 
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area-specific negotation systems tend to produce results that externalize costs, thus raising 
the problem of coordinating different issue areas. Will-formation in the broader public seems 
to be an adequate mechanism for the control and coordination of issue area-specific 
negotiation systems. The establishment of issue area-specific negotiation systems within a 
national demos reduces the tendency of cost externalization and even rent-seeking in such 
systems. For instance, outright egoistic behavior appears to be a much more common 
feature among European Commissioners than among national politicians. In this sense, the 
institutionalization of a broader public that reaches beyond the spheres of issue networks 
and can possibly sanction them through majority decisions seems to be a prerequisite for the 
smooth functioning of issue area-specific negotiation systems (Peters 1997).  
 
There is a further drawback to non-majoritarian decision-making procedures. Negotiation 
systems that require unanimous decisions can never lead to redistributive measures, 
because any "rational" faction would veto any measure that required them to relinquish 
resources. What is more, "(...) negotiation systems will not be able to deal effectively with 
issues involving high levels of distributive conflict among the parties to the negotiation" 
(Scharpf 1997a: 209). Even within the field of regulatory policy, then, the implementation of 
non-majoritarian decision-making procedures only has limited possibilities, since it poses 
problems for regulatory policies with significant (re-)distributive implications. To rely upon 
non-majoritarian decision-making processes as the linchpin of democratic governance 
beyond the nation state, as does Majone (1996, 1998), is therefore to evade the problem. If 
the implementation of social policy and regulatory policies with strong distributive implications 
are hampered at the national level by international competition, and obstructed at the 
international level by non-majoritarian decision-making processes, then the initial question 
re-emerges how effective and democratically legitimate governance beyond the nation state 
can be accomplished. At all events, the national constellation in which "cultural integration 
legitimated duties of solidarity even in the strong sense of accepting individual disadvantages 
for the sake of the whole, and functional completeness of the national economy made it 
possible", (Streeck 1998: 19) seems to be a thing of the past. The postnational constellation 
(Habermas 1998) therefore requires a re-thinking of the criteria for democratic governance, 
looking beyond national social democracy on the one hand and a merely normative 
justification of already observable elements of governance beyond the nation state on the 
other. 
 
A close examination of the social prerequisites for democracy brings the problems of any 
notion of democracy beyond the nation state to the fore. Majoritarian decision-making is 
hardly achievable beyond the national level since it requires some form of collective identity 
that includes trust and solidarity. Negotiation systems based on argumentative consensus-
building also only work if they can build on at least a weak form of collective identity which 
includes the mutual acceptance of autonomy and common values. Therefore, negotiation 
systems are also dependent on the fulfilment of social prerequisites by the collective to be 
governed. Moreover, these negotiation systems display specific weaknesses such as a lack 
of transparency, deficits in the coordination of cross-cutting issue areas and problems in 
agreeing on redistributive policies. Although consensus-oriented negotiation systems will be 
an important element of any form of democracy beyond the nation state, the democratic 
quality of governance cannot be enhanced by drawing up a "new model" of democracy which 
completely downgrades majoritarian decision-making processes. 
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4. Disaggregating the demos 
 
One virtue of international institutions lies in their acknowledgement that those affected by 
political decisions are often not all situated within one national jurisdiction. Moreover, they 
may restore the factual freedom of politics. Nevertheless, without any form of demos 
international institutions will necessarily have democratic deficits. Against this background 
skeptics argue that the democratization of international institutions is unattainable, since a 
demos is systematically related to national identity. However, if the arguments concerning 
the social prerequisites for democracy laid down in the former section are further developed, 
it can be demonstrated that demos  is a broad and ambiguous term. The very strong claim of 
the skeptics that there is no demos beyond national borders needs differentiation. Only by 
deconstructing the all-embracing term demos can it be established what element of a demos 
is required for what component of democracy, and the validity of the skeptics' statement thus 
be tested. 
 
Rights: The members of a demos acknowledge each other as autonomous individuals, each 
with a right to personal self-fulfilment. In this sense, civil liberty rights, including the right to 
physical integrity as well as the right to participate in will-formation and decision-making 
processes, are constitutionally embodied in any democratic political community. Within the 
OECD world, a transnational concern for human rights can largely be assumed to exist. 
Increasingly, civil society actors sue for human rights and protection from arbitrary violence 
on a transnational scale, and people organize themselves transnationally to prevent 
infringements of human rights "abroad". Societal denationalization has heightened the 
signficance of these transnational monitoring activities. Even the legally binding incorporation 
of individually suable human rights is guaranteed by the European Human Rights 
Commission, and there is evidence of similar developments outside of Europe, too (Donnelly 
1993, Evans 1997). If problems with clear transboundary implications arise, it is more or less 
accepted that all the affected countries are fully entitled to have their say as long as they are 
represented by democratically elected politicians. Moreover, this principle is additionally 
fostered by the transnational mutual acknowledgement of the importance of participation in 
decision-making processes at the national level. The steady increase in election monitoring, 
for example, shows that political rights, including those of people in other countries, are 
increasingly being defended on a transnational scale (Rosenau 1997: 259). The 
acknowledgement of each other as autonomous individuals, each with a right to personal 
self-fulfilment, which is the fundamental principle of any democratic politcal community, thus 
seems to cross national borders in denationalized societies.  
 
Trust: The members of a demos accept that once an obligation has been entered into, it 
must be complied with. This aspect of a democratic political community also appears to be 
relatively well-established in the OECD world. It is generally accepted that agreed 
international obligations should be fulfilled and this is increasingly demanded by national 
populations. Indeed, if this were not the case, it would be hard to explain why most western 
states comply with international contractual obligations (Henkin 1968, Chayes/Chayes 1995). 
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The origins of these principles can be seen as mutual obligations that arise in a society of 
states and may thus be construed as sense of duty at the state (rather than the individual) 
level (Bull 1977). However, it can be demonstrated that the compliance pull of international 
regulations increases when societal participation in decision-making processes is possible 
(Victor et al. 1998: Part II). Moreover, the compliance pull of international regulations is 
strongest when they are politically, juridically and socially internalized (Koh 1997). If it is true 
that societal participation in the making of international rules and their internalization 
increases rather than decreases rule compliance, it is safe to assume that a mutual 
obligation to follow rules once they have been agreed upon has developed in the OECD 
world. Today, political trust is not restricted to the national and the intergovernmental sphere, 
but has also entered the transnational sphere. 
 
Public spirit: Members of a fully developed demos also show a sense of collective identity if 
their preferences as individuals include a concern for the well-being (or the suffering) of the 
collective. In its weak form, such a sense of collective identity (Gemeinsinn, or public spirit) is 
a precondition for public deliberations about the right solution for the community as a whole. 
Where there is no Gemeinsinn there is no arguing. Although reference is often made to 
common values in the OECD world, there is little transnational public debate on the "right" 
policies for the Western world as a whole. However, transnational sectoral publics and 
"sectoral demoi" (Abromeit/Schmidt 1998), which can at least roughly be described as 
holding deliberations on the right policies, do exist. Against this background it comes as no 
surprise that in more recent analyses of democratic legitimacy the focus has shifted to 
international political processes in which aggregative decision-making is dominated by 
deliberative components that emphasize arguing over bargaining. In 1996, for instance, in 
the multi-level system of the European Union, there were 409 committees active in the 
implementation of general Council decisions. These committees enjoy extensive 
interpretative freedom in their work (see Falke 1996; Wessels 1998). Their members are 
mainly experts and representatives of concerned interest groups, as well as national civil 
servants selected by their governments, and the committees' decisions usually meet with 
approval (see, e.g., Eichener 1996, Joerges/ Neyer 1997). Particularly within the field of 
environmental politics, similar developments can even be observed at the international level. 
After the admission of transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the process, 
international negotiations received an impetus that clearly distinguished them from 
conventional intergovernmental negotiations. The inclusion of NGOs has elevated the status 
of epistemic communities (Adler/Haas 1992, Princen/Finger 1994), which has helped 
strengthen deliberative elements at the expense of simple bargaining elements, and also 
contributed to the relativization of particular interests by public interests (see Gehring 1995). 
These developments can be taken as an indicator for the presence of a weak form of 
collective identity which is necessary to transform intergovernmental bargaining into 
transnational negotiations and thus enhance their democratic quality. 
 
Public discourse: Public spirit can be transformed into public discourse if most of the 
members affected by the decision have a capacity to communicate publicly. The participation 
of expert communities and the direct addressees of regulations in deliberative issue networks 
is possible because they are public spirited and they posess the capacities and resources to 
communicate with each other in arenas beyond the nation state. Transnational sectoral 
publics (Eder/Hellmann/Trenz 1998: 324-326) rest on social differentiation and stratification 
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and evolve as issue networks around specific issue areas. These sectoral publics are dense 
communication networks with permeable borders, allowing a more active participation than 
the broader public discourse. However, sectoral publics are always in danger of becoming 
captive to particular interests and developing rent-seeking behavior, neglecting the public 
interests. The decisive question is therefore how effectively those at the social periphery can 
transport their problems and issues into the political center (see Peters 1994: 56). In this 
sense, a broader public discourse extending beyond the sectoral publics should be 
institutionalized to avoid the systematic emergence of two problems: the misappropriation of 
issue networks by particular interests, and the lack of coordination between issue networks 
(see Zürn/Wolf 1998). However, in contrast to sectoral publics, the institutionalization of a 
broader public discourse is dependent on a common language and media as well as a party 
system, and as yet, the infrastructure for a broader public discourse is still quite weak at the 
European level and hardly developed at all beyond that. 
 
Solidarity: In its stronger form, a collective sense of identity provides the basis for 
(re)distributive processes within a political community. Solidarity is the willingness of 
individuals are prepared to give up things they value for the sake of the collective, and the 
acceptance of redistributive policies is the best indicator for this. Although the EU's Regional 
and Structural Funds reflect some awareness of redistributive obligations at the European 
level, a recognizeable sense of transnational social obligations is barely perceptible. While 
redistributive programs to deal with catastrophies exist, they have an ad hoc character and 
aim mainly at rescuing people. Humanitarian activities of this sort are more accurately 
interpreted as evidence of support for the notion of a transnational concern for human rights. 
On the other hand, it is not clear whether this strong sense of collective identity as suggested 
by the acceptance of redistributive measures is necessary for democracy. National 
democracies differ widely in their use of redistributive policies, and even within individual 
nation states, acceptance of such measures varies from one region to another. 
 
The preceding differentiation shows that the skeptics' notion of a demos consists of a 
number of analytically separable components. Although the mutual acceptance of rights, 
mutual trust, public spirit, public opinion and solidarity are all important underlying conditions 
for democratic processes, not all of them are requirements for all types of democratic 
decision-making. In the OECD world, it seems to be generally accepted that all those 
affected by a denationalized issue must be represented in the process of international policy 
formulation. Mutual political rights and congruence are thus acknowledged as a transnational 
normative criterion. At the same time there are some issue areas in which transnational 
sectoral networks deliberate semi-publicly over the right common course of action to take. 
Elements of a transnational political community with supervisory functions can also be 
identified in the monitoring of national governments' implementation of international policies 
and in the transboundary recognition of individual human rights. These observations in no 
way suggest that the democratic legitimacy of governance beyond the nation state is already 
sufficient. However, it does indicate that democratic processes beyond the nation state must 
not be ruled out as an unalterable matter of principle until all aspects of a demos are fully 
developed. Equally, there is no reason to assume that the fruition of a demos depends on a 
high degree of cultural homogeneity and is thus only feasible within a national context. It 
seems much more practical to establish what kind of democratic processes can be 
generated on the basis of the (partially) given components of a demos. To this end, more 
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systematic research should focus on the question which aspects of a transnational demos 
already exist and can be further developed within a democratic framework. In any event, the 
above disaggregation of the term demos raises justifiable doubts about the first hypothesis of 
the skeptics that there is no demos other than the national. 
 
At the same time, the disaggregation of the term demos suggests that solidarity and public 
discourse are the two weakest features of an emergent demos beyond the nation state. With 
respect to public opinion discourse it can reasonably be argued that this is not due to a lack 
of transnational public spirit, but rather to infrastructural difficulties, that is the absence of a 
common language, common media and a common party system, which are vital for public 
discourse. At all events, the existence of transnational issue networks with deliberative 
elements indicates that the lack of cultural homogeneity does not appear to be the major 
reason for the absence of a broader public discourse. 
 
Cultural heterogeneity seems to be most relevant with respect to the development of a sense 
of solidarity. For the skeptics, democracy beyond the nation state is unthinkable because the 
central element of their notion of democracy is social rights. In their view, individual acts of 
solidarity depend on cultural integration (cf. Streeck 1998: 19). Solidarity, however, also 
implies the exclusion of others (Linklater 1998: 113). It can reasonably be assumed that here 
the skeptics confuse citizenship rights, which were "extremely exclusive from the very 
origination of the concept" (see Preuss 1998: 20) with democracy, which is an all-inclusive 
concept. The skeptics' argument and their tendency to overgeneralize it is driven by the fear 
of "a liberal bias of intergovernmental and non-state political arenas" (Streeck 1998: 15). 
Even if there is no strong sense of collective identity in terms of solidarity and willingness to 
make sacrifices, this does not mean that the social prerequisites for democracy are 
completely lacking. 
 
 
5. The Democratization of International Institutions 
 
The second descriptive statement that underlies the skeptical argument postulates a zero-
sum relationship between national sovereignty and supranationality. Following this argument, 
the democratization of international institutions is impossible since any institutional reform will 
reduce either system effectiveness or democratic legitimation. "Any solution between the 
extreme poles of nation-state sovereignty on the one hand and accomplished European 
supranationality on the other (...) will necessarily infringe on both the protective capacity of 
the welfare state as well as democratic legitimation" (Offe 1998: 119; translation: M.Z.). 
Again, trepidation about a liberal bias and the dissolution of national solidarity seems to lie 
behind this statement. Since, in the view of skeptics, a normatively acceptable form of 
solidarity depends on cultural homogeneity, they appear to lend cultural homogeneity a 
normative status. 
 
In purely normative terms, however, cultural pluralism is actually a logical precondition for a 
democratic process. In Oliver Gerstenberg's words (1997b: 350): "Democratic self-
government is not thwarted by, but rather benefits from, the heterogeneity of participants and 
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comprehensive moral outlooks."14 The practicability of democracy is not dependent on a fully 
cultivated demos from the outset. Moreover, a demos is not a pre-political entity, the result of 
cultural (in an apolitical sense) or even ethnic homogeneity. As the development of 
democratic nation states has shown, the components of demos and democracy are mutually 
reinforcing. As March and Olsen (1995: 37) put it: "[Good citizens] deliberate on the basis of 
a sense of community that is itself reinforced by the process of deliberation."  
 
To be sure, the borderlines of a demos are not automatically identical with those of social 
spaces. The theory of nationalism identifies a number of requirements for the development of 
a demos, for example, the increasing density of transactions (Deutsch 1953), the functional 
requirements arising out of growing interdependencies (Gellner 1983), the existence of an 
administrative apparatus (Breuilly 1994) and sufficient means of communication (Anderson 
1991). Clearly, then, the boundaries and the strength of a demos are not given, but socially 
and politically defined. The complex and dynamic relationship between political institutions 
and the different aspects of the demos can be used in a way that challenges the zero-sum 
logic of the skeptical argument. If it is possible to identify institutional solutions that improve 
democratic legitimation without downgrading the effectiveness of social policies, then the 
second hypothesis of the skeptics can be rejected. 
 
What kind of institutional policy would facilitate the development of democratic governance 
beyond the nation state? The answer is a policy comprising a mixture of different democratic 
components. In order to find the ideal combination it is necessary to make two categorical 
distinctions, one pertaining to the constitutive processes of a democracy and the other to the 
constitutive actors of a democracy. With regard to the first distinction, we must note that a 
democratic comprises both aggregative and deliberative elements. Aggregative processes, in 
which all the participants try to assert their interests unconditionally, are not sufficient to 
constitute a democracy. Deliberative processes are also necessary, in which all participants 
have to justify their concerns as a matter of public interest, and in this respect, argue instead 
of bargain with each other. Nevertheless, it is highly improbable that deliberative processes 
will culminate in a consensual decision as a result of this discourse. At some point, during 
the process, there will be no other alternative but to terminate the deliberations and move on 
to a process of aggregation, or to vote and come to a decision by unanimity or the majority 
principle. 
 
Turning to the second distinction it is important to see that although the normative reference 
points of democracy are ultimately individual, autonomous persons, the actors in a 
democracy can be individuals or corporative actors. In a parliamentary democracy, for 
example, individuals vote for representatives who are answerable only to their consciences. 
Individual democratic actors also act in so-called direct democratic processes, for instance at 
municipal meetings and in referenda. In contrast, collective organizations represent the 
interests of their members. Representatives of these organizations attend international 
negotiations as agents of the organizations and are thus answerable to their organizations 
(rather than to their consciences). Here, the organizations function as actors.  
 
Crossing both types of actors with the two fundamental democratic processes yields four 
                                                                                 
14 In a completely different historical context, Friedrich (1939) feared that the democratic 
requirements for a shared ethos may lead to totalitarian indoctrination. 
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single components of a democratic process, each of which signifies a different form of 
interest mediation (see table 1).15 The bracketed terms in each box identify problems 
associated with a bias in favor of that particular component.16 The key is to find the 
appropriate mix of components for a given political community. 
 
Table 1: Components of a democratic process 
 
ACTORS 
 
PROCEDURES 
Individuals Organizations (territorial or 
sectoral) 
Deliberative Direct deliberative democracy 
("Schwatzbude") 
Associative democracy 
(expertocracy) 
Aggregative Majoritarian democracy 
(telecracy) 
Bargaining democracy 
(Eurocracy) 
 
It has been found that the appropriate mix depends on historical circumstances. The citizens' 
meetings in Athenian times, for example, when the low number of potential participants made 
the proceedings easy to survey, were dominated by direct-deliberative elements. In large 
democratic federal nation states like Germany, by contrast, all components are relatively 
evenly represented. There is majority-voting in elections, and bargaining within the federal 
elements of the German political system. Meanwhile, the "Verbändestaat" (state-dominated 
and penetrated by interest associations) denounced by Theodor Eschenburg in 1963 gave 
rise not just to bargaining, but also to public interest-oriented deliberations, for instance in 
corporative organizations. Finally, the German Parliament – in theory, at least – is the locus 
for public debate on choosing the "right" political course. 
 
In the EU and other international institutions, however, there is today a strong bias towards 
the aggregation of state interests. Intergovernmental negotiations, which are mostly of a 
strategic nature (but see Müller 1994), take place in camera and follow the principle of 
unanimity, represent an infringement of democratic principles (see Section 2), while other 
forms of interest mediation beyond the nation state are underdeveloped, or are, like majority 
decision procedures, problematic in the absence of social prerequisites. However, in the face 
of denationalization, neither traditional intergovernmental bargaining nor consensus-oriented 
forms of decision-making by experts or majority voting alone can do the job. As with national 
democracies, it is, as Benz (1998) puts it, a question of finding the right combination. Given 
this analysis, for the democratization of international institutions and the EU it is necessary to 
focus on three aspects: First, the democratization of territorial representation in international 
bargaining; second, the strengthening of other components of the democratic process; third, 
institutional solutions that strengthen the transnational demos, particularly its weaker 
elements such as transnational public discourse and transnational solidarity. 
 
In order to disprove the skeptics' zero-sum hypothesis, institutional solutions to the problems 
                                                                                 
15 See also Heinelt (1997), who distinguishes between territorial, administrative, civil society and 
functional forms of interest mediation within the EU. 
16 For a similar typology of democratic components see Cohen/Sabel (1997). Instead of including 
constitutive actors in the second dimension, these authors distinguish between direct and 
representative proceedings. 
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described must respond to one of these three demands without weakening other democratic 
components or reducing system effectiveness. Skeptics are most often concerned about 
reduced system effectiveness, especially in the field of social policy. It should therefore be 
ascertained whether any of the institutional suggestions for democratizing international 
institutions restricts the chances for welfare policies. If "pareto-improving" suggestions are 
conceivable that enhance democratic legitimation on one count without decreasing it on 
another, or reducing system effectiveness, they can go a long way towards weakening a 
further background hypothesis of the skeptics.  
 
Bargaining procedures – democratization of territorial representation: A central feature of 
multi-level politics is that national representatives agree in camera on norms and rules to be 
implemented at the national level. As a rule, the same government representative who 
conducted the negotiations then lobbies for the approval of the results by his or her national 
parliament and public. The problem with having the same agent to act on different levels, 
however, is that she or he is better informed than anyone else. This can be put to strategic 
use or abuse. One example of this is an increase in credit-claiming and scapegoating in 
national politics. Thus, every economic crisis is caused by a worldwide economic depression, 
and every economic boom is the result of national economic policy; a rising crime rate is a 
manifestation of international trends, but a drop in crime is brought about by the 
implementation of national measures, and so on. Furthermore, the fact that the executive is 
typically better informed than actors in other branches of government puts the latter at a 
disadvantage in the agenda-setting process (Moravcsik 1994, Rieger 1995, Wolf 1997). 
 
In international regimes with a limited range of regulations the afore-mentioned problems of 
multi-level politics are tolerable. Because the opportunities for linkage across relatively 
narrowly defined issue areas are limited, it is comparatively easy to keep track of the 
organizations' affairs. In such cases, simpler measures are sufficient to increase 
transparency and facilitate the monitoring of executive activities. For instance, every national 
negotiating team (which as a rule is made up of government representatives) could be 
accompanied by a small group of observers without the right to speak or vote, whose main 
function would be to inform the national public about the government's point of view, behavior 
and bargaining strategy. This group could include members of the parliamentary opposition, 
but to prevent the possibility of information being strategically abused by the opposition, it 
should also include well-known and highly credible experts from the relevant issue area. 
 
In the case of the European Union, where the government conferences and the European 
Council negotiate on almost all internationalized issue areas, the problem of non-
transparency is particularly acute. It is almost impossible for citizens to hold specific 
governments or representatives responsible for political outcomes. In multi-level systems 
with relatively distinct borderlines (i.e. with an identical membership over a large number of 
issue areas) different persons, each having their own legitimacy, should represent different 
levels of the system. For the EU, this would mean that the national representatives of the 
Council of Ministers would be elected directly by their national constituents in an election 
separate from that for the national government. This would drastically shorten the Council of 
Ministers' chain of legitimization and at the same time transform it into a legitimate collective 
body. Both the national governments and the national representatives in the Council of 
Ministers would then have to account for their policies individually before the public. This 
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would almost certainly lead to frequent conflicts, which would have the much-desired effect 
of promoting transparency, and make it clear to the public what their role is within the a multi-
level system. It would then be much easier for the national public to decide who is 
responsible for what policy. The American political system, in which governors are elected 
separately from senators, is an example of such an arrangement.17 The democratization of 
territorial representation in the European decision-making system in this way would also be 
beneficial to the growth of a European sense of identity. At the same time, it would reinforce 
the deliberative component of the process insofar as the national representatives would be 
forced to emphasize the European dimensions of their policies in order to maintain the 
support of the electorate.  
 
Moreover, there are no grounds for the assumption that this form of democratization would 
further impair system effectiveness in the field of welfare policy. On the contrary, the 
privileged position of national executives as a link between the levels was regularly exploited 
precisely for the purpose of liberalizing the economy and cutting back welfare. Thatcher's 
interest in a common market has been intimately connected with her interest in dismantling 
the British welfare state (Moravcsik 1998: chap. 5), Clinton used NAFTA arbitration 
proceedings to curb a protectionist Congress (Goldstein 1996), and German Finance 
Minister Waigel used his position to stave off demands for an energy tax (see footnote 12). 
These examples are hardly accidental. In many national democracies, welfare systems are 
so strongly institutionalized and so widely accepted that significant cuts can only be made by 
strategic maneuvers (see Pierson 1996). Contrary to the skeptics' hypothesis, then, the 
democratization of territorial representation should increase rather than reduce system 
effectiveness in the field of social policy.  
 
Associative Democracy - Increasing the Representativeness of Deliberative Networks: 
Despite the arguments against institutionalizing deliberative bargaining networks (see 
Section 2), their added potential for democratizing governance beyond the nation state 
should not be neglected. Some studies of comitology within the EU come to very positive 
conclusions. On the one hand, EU committees explicitly fulfil the congruence requirement 
because they take the interests of all those affected by an issue into account, and not just 
those within a particular country. On the other hand they are conducive to deliberative 
behavior which transcends strategic intergovernmental bargaining (Joerges/Neyer 1997). 
Similarly, Giandomenico Majone (1996: 286) advocates the role of independent agencies as 
a means of social regulation: "Recent empirical research provides additional evidence in 
favour of the thesis that non-majoritarian decision-making mechanisms are more suitable for 
complex, plural societies than are mechanisms that concentrate power in the hands of the 
political majority". The democratic potential of incorporating NGOs and epistemic 
communities has been demonstrated with respect to environmental policy. Issue networks 
become upgraded to sectoral publics through the incorporation of these groups and the 
diffuse interests they often represent (Beisheim 1997, Schmidt/Take 1997, Wapner 1995). 
 
The democratic quality of deliberative issue networks is heightened if the participating 
organizations are representative in two respects. First, they must adequately represent their 
membership; and second, they must not be an elite group. Decision-making networks must 
                                                                                 
17 See Riker (1955) for an extremely instructive analysis of the development of the American Senate.  
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in principle be open and transparent to all the groups affected by the regulation – self-
selection of the members of a deliberative decision-making network must be ruled out. 
 
Transnational issue networks should therefore be strengthened, but at the same time 
subjected to entry criteria. These criteria should be designed to permit all those interest 
groups to participate (i) which can offer a satisfactory justification for their concern and thus 
be helpful in the implementation of the regulation in question; (ii) which have established 
organizations in several of the countries concerned; and (iii) whose internal structures and 
procedures are democratic and open to scrutiny. From the point of view of democratic theory, 
the last requirement is of central significance if the role of the interest group or epistemic 
community in decision-making processes extends beyond merely exerting influence to 
counteract other interests. If an interest group, an NGO or an epistemic community 
participates in either the making or the implementation of a collectively binding decision, or if 
the exit option is not cost-free for its members (i.e. the source of the group's influence), the 
group must be democratically organized. This means that its membership must be open to all 
regardless of party-membership, race or sex; organizational leadership must be freely 
elected; its political structure, including the disclosure of its income and expenditure, must be 
open to all members; and it must not pursue profit-seeking activities. 
 
There are no reasons why a better representation of widespread interests in deliberative 
issue-networks should impair welfare system effectiveness. On the contrary, a more 
balanced representation of issue networks at G-7 meetings should improve the chances of 
developing an international framework which takes individual national welfare policies into 
account. For instance, an agreement that the poverty rate in OECD countries should not 
exceed 10 per cent would constitue an international regulatory policy that facilitates 
redistributive policies at the national level. An international regime such as this would take 
the different national economic productivies into consideration and leave it up to member 
states to decide on the measure and welfare system by which the goal is to be achieved (the 
poverty rate is assessed relative to national average income). In this way, such an 
international regime would have little (if any) redistributive implications at the national level 
and could thus conceivably be the result of deliberations among all the affected interests 
within an issue network. Again, welfare system effectiveness and the democratization of 
political institutions beyond the nation state are not mutually exclusive. 
 
Majority voting – Promoting Referenda: Political scientists usually advise against legitimation 
by majority voting in international decision-making systems. This is indeed a valid warning 
against naive conceptions of a European or world-wide state system, but at the same time it 
reflects a static view of democratic political institutions, which are not just founded on the 
basis of demoi, but in turn also generate and reinforce them. Rainer Schmalz-Bruns (1997: 
65) correctly notes that "taking a side-entrance (by the bargaining method) seems to sap 
more potential for a sense of political community than it creates" (translation: M.Z.). It thus 
seems desirable to identify procedures which could be helpful in improving the social 
prerequisites for democracy, especially those which contribute to public discourse (see 
Section 3). Given the interactive relationship between demos and democratic institutions, 
such an improvement would itself contribute to democratization. 
 
The aim must therefore be to introduce majoritarian procedures that, initially, function in the 
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absence of a fully developed European demos while at the same time fostering its 
development without endangering what has been already achieved. Within the context of the 
European multi-level system, European referenda on more general issues could be a useful 
instrument. Although the national referenda on the Maastricht Agreement clearly exposed the 
EU's legitimacy problems, they also showed that such significant political events can 
encourage public discourse (see Luthardt 1993). A referendum is more than just a ballot. It 
differs from pure "telecracy" by virtue of a phase of public discourse which is at least as 
signficant as the ballot itself. If referenda were held across Europe it would be futile to 
instrumentalize them for national purposes (as happened with the referenda on the 
Maastricht Agreement). European-wide referenda could then constitute a political decision-
making instrument for an extended political arena, with the potential for both community-
building and even encouraging public deliberation. In addition, referenda could be called for 
the specific purpose of increasing the chances of reversing those policies in the EU which 
appear to be rent-seeking. Referenda are furthermore a good mechanism for breaking real or 
perceived political cartels (Frey 1994; Wagschal 1997), and political systems that feature 
direct democratic elements seem to have a longer time-horizon (Schmidt 1998). 
 
This is not as far-fetched as it may seem. Comparative democratic research has shown that 
referenda help to counterbalance deficits in bargaining democracies (see Schmidt 1995: 
chap. 3.4). In highly heterogeneous societies, national political systems which feature strong 
bargaining components not seldom offer considerable possibilities for direct citizen 
participation as well. Two particular examples are the US, where strong direct democratic 
elements exist at a local level and in individual states, and Switzerland, where more 
referenda have been held since 1945 than in any other democratic system. Nor do direct 
democratic elements offer a "premium for demagogues" – as the former German Federal 
President Theodor Heuss suspected. Rather they act as a stabilizing force by offering the 
electorate a means of checking the high-handedness and empty actionism of the political 
class. Referenda are also accredited for their integrative effect. Of course, referenda can 
increase the cost and duration of a decision-making process. Contrary to popular opinion, 
however, this does not seem to be the EU's major problem with decision-making. Although 
the time it takes for an EU regulation to come into effect, from the day it is officially proposed 
by the Commission to the day of the Council's final decision, has increased over the past few 
years to around 160 days, this is not appreciably longer than in most national political 
systems (König/Schulz 1996). Thus it comes as no surprise that a number of proposals have 
been advanced for the introduction of European-wide referenda to counterbalance the 
dominance of bargaining democracy (Abromeit 1998, Grande 1997). 
 
The question that remains to be answered is what decisions should be put to European-wide 
referenda. Clearly, there are a number of issues for which referenda are not the appropriate 
form of decision-making, at least initially. In the first place, an issue must be significant 
enough to generate the publicity needed for a referendum. A new milk quota regulation is 
therefore not a suitable subject. Second, the issue to be voted on should not be one that has 
primarily redistributive implications, as this may give rise to conflicts between member states 
which could jeopardize the existing level of integration. Redistributive measures are generally 
accepted only if the demos already has a strong sense of identity; they do not provide a good 
basis for generating such an identity. Thus, given that a European political community has 
yet to be formed, the reform of the common agricultural policy would not be a good candidate 
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for a European-wide referendum.  
 
This leaves policies that are a result of majoritarian politics (Wilson 1980). These are policies 
which spread costs and benefits evenly across the population and transcend the (ever-
present) interests of particular parties. A classic example is defence measures, which would 
be quite appropriate for European referenda – for example, a proposed extension of common 
foreign and security policies. Similarly, the results of negotiations for entry into the EU could 
be decided on by referenda, not only in the countries under consideration but in the whole of 
the Union. Environmental policy is a third candidate inasmuch as environmental measures 
typically lead to higher consumer prices but generate benefits that are enjoyed throughout 
Europe. Where constitutional questions18 are concerned, however, referenda should be held 
under the application of strong restraints and with a qualified majority, if, for instance, a 
qualified majority in the European Parliament were to vote for a referendum, or a 
transnational quorum of ten percent of the European electorate were reached. For "normal" 
(as opposed to constitutional) policies lower, but still transnational quora should be sufficient 
to call a referendum. The European Parliament should decide on policies to be categorized 
as majoritarian and these should be specified on a list which can be supplemented over 
time.19
 
In the short run, this form of democratizing international institutions will by definition not curb 
the effectiveness of social policies. In the long run, it could even foster solidarity.20 This 
appears, then, to be another institutional proposal that may promote the democratization of 
supranational instutions without reducing system effectiveness. 
 
As Much Direct Deliberative Democracy as Possible: In a direct deliberative democracy, 
collective decisions are made by public deliberation in local fora in which any individual 
concerned can participate. Some theorists see direct deliberative procedures as the central 
component of a future democracy project (Cohen/Sabel 1997, Cohen/Rogers 1998), despite 
the claim that direct deliberative democracy is unable to solve today's crucial problems and 
in fact reduces system effectiveness. Indeed, many transactions are transnational, which 
renders direct deliberative policies ineffective. However, it might be appropriate to reinforce 
the direct deliberative component for the regulation of issues which arise at a local level. 
Ceteris paribus, it is easier to democratize decision-making processes in small communities, 
and it is easier for individuals to cope with the complexity of governance if there are clearly 
defined areas in which their direct participation and influence can be experienced. In this 
                                                                                 
18 The term "constitution" is more broadly applied here than the legal term, which is related to the 
traditional state concept. In this paper, constitutional questions include all those questions 
concerning the structure of the European polity. 
19 An institutional proposal that follows the same logic is the introduction of EU-wide party lists 
instead of nationl party lists for elections to the European Parliament. Suggestions for common 
electoral systems are already to some extent discussed in the EP. See Reuters, 15.7.1998, which 
refers to proposals put forward by the Greek Christian Democrat and member of the Committee 
on Institutional Affairs Georgios Anastassopolous. I owe this hint to Thomas Lundberg. 
20 Institutional policies which generate a sense of community are hardly transferable to multi-level 
politics outside the EU system. The multi-level politics of conventional international institutions 
differ from the European multi-level system in that the different sectoral European regulations are 
extremely tightly interwoven. They thus form a kind of network which constitutes a new political 
arena (albeit with rather hazy outlines), within which majority voting is plausible. Only with a 
durable political arena such as this does it make sense to introduce majority decision-making 
procedures which are potentially beneficial to public welfare. 
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respect, the strengthening of direct deliberative democratic elements in small regional 
political units seems to be an urgently necessary correlate to the strengthening of bargaining 
elements beyond the national realm.  
 
Moreover, the development of new communication technologies makes the application of this 
type of decision-making plausible, even for transnational issues. As an example, the 
development of some of the technical standards related to the Internet, such as the TCP/IP 
protocol, seems to come close this form of interest mediation. The TCP/IP protocol is 
developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a sub-organisation of the Internet 
Society (ISOC). This issue network is open to all users who are registered on the Society's 
mailing list and thus constitute a membership. Decisions are made on the basis of discourses 
in different fora that  are regulated by a number of procedural rules. Decisions are taken on 
the basis of a strongly qualified majority and after a new standard has demonstrated its 
effectiveness it is put into practise. The decision are then made public with the help of the 
mailing lists (see e.g. Hofmann 1998). 
 
Of course, it is unlikely that direct deliberative democracy conceptualized thus can be applied 
to effect redistribution in a transnational context. Nevertheless, it would certainly not reduce 
system effectiveness in those issue areas in which it could be applied. Moreover, direct 
deliberative democracy carries an implicit notion of "egalitarianism" which is normatively 
defensible and yet quite critical of traditional welfare policies (Cohen/Rogers 1998).  
 
In sum, the institutional suggestions discussed in this section can improve democratic 
legitimation without downgrading the effectiveness of social policies, thus casting doubt on 
the second hypothesis of the skeptics. Although the skeptics' focus on the social 
prerequisites for democracy is useful, the emphasis on the complexities and dynamics in the 
relationship between political institutions and social attitudes facilitates a vision of democracy 
beyond the nation-state through institutional reform. 
 
 
6. Individuals and Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation State 
 
The nation state acquired a symbolic framework at an early stage of its history which 
facilitated the development of a strong national identity. This made the nation state uniquely 
able to go beyond face-to-face relations and serve the collective desires of the so-called 
imagined community (Anderson 1991). In many instances, the emergence of a strong 
national identity brought great suffering in its wake but, in time, national identity was matched 
with a civil constitution in most OECD countries. A fully developed civil political community 
not only facilitates the democratic process, but is also constituted by it. On the basis of this 
two-way causal relationship, democratic multi-level politics may eventually create an 
orientation towards a public interest beyond the nation state. Nevertheless, for the time 
being, democratic governance beyond the nation state must manage without a fully 
developed demos comprising all the components dealt with in this paper. In any case, 
governance beyond the nation state will satisfy the demand for a collective identity much less 
completely than did the nation state of the early twentieth century, and this will simply refer 
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the problem of identity back to the social sphere. Ultimately, democratic governance beyond 
the nation state is based on a political and moral vision of reflective self-regulation by self-
governing individuals and organizations who are prepared to forgo their own rational 
interests if there are good universalistic reasons for public interest-oriented behavior. 
 
This vision implies the participation of competent citizens (Münkler 1997) with an 
unprecedented degree of intellectual capacity, normative tolerance and solidarity. As far as 
the first element is concerned, individuals are better equipped than ever. In 1892 the 
correspondent of a well-known journal wrote that, as a result of the spread of modern 
newspapers, the inhabitants of a provincial village knew more about general social and 
political developments than the head of a government had one hundred years previously 
(Giddens 1990: 77).The same could be said today. Anyone today who visits a large city only 
once a year is confronted with a broader array of lifestyles, cultures and social environments 
than could ever have been envisioned by our great-grandparents. In the modern age, and 
particularly in the last few decades, individuals have achieved new levels of self-
determination and competence and are much better able to fulfil a central requirement of 
democratic governance beyond the nation state. 
 
Whether this skill revolution (Rosenau/Fagen 1997) is sufficient, however, remains to be 
seen. "World citizenship with republican intentions" (Beck 1998) requires moral as well as 
cognitive competence, and here the outlook is somewhat bleaker. There is a widely held 
view in sociology that public spirit and solidarity are decaying, a civil deficit attributed to the 
all-dominant power of market structures, which consume the potential for solidarity, and state 
welfarism, which strips individuals of their sense of joint responsibility. There is, however, 
also empirical evidence that paints a different picture (see, for instance, Wuthnow 1991) and 
rejects the idea that individualism and public spirit are mutually exclusive. In the final 
analysis, the chances for democracy beyond the nation state depend on people. But that is 
really nothing new. 
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